Abstract. We show that the following are equivalent in KPi+∃ r⊆ω V = L(r), where KPi extends Kripke-Platek set theory by the axiom that each set lies in some admissible set: (1) any true formula with real parameters holds in some transitive set; (2) induction over ∆(R)-definable well-founded classes; (3) induction over the values of countable dilators on the class of ordinals.
Introduction
Connections between reflection and induction principles are well-known in the context of first and second order arithmetic: Due to G. Kreisel and A. Lévy [15] , reflection (with parameters) over elementary arithmetic is equivalent to induction along the natural numbers, while reflection over Peano arithmetic is equivalent to induction along (the usual notation system for) the ordinal ε 0 = min{α | ω α = α} (these results have been refined by D. Leivant [16] and H. Ono [18] ). As shown by H. Friedman [7] , the principle of ω-model reflection in second order arithmetic is equivalent to bar induction, i. e. induction along arbitrary well-orders on N (this result has been refined by S. Simpson [23] as well as G. Jäger and T. Strahm [11] ). In the present paper we establish an analogous result for set theory.
Reflection principles in set theory express that any suitable property of the settheoretic universe is already satisfied in some set. To justify them one can reason as follows: If we can conceive of a universe with a certain property, then we should be able to view this universe as a set and go beyond it. A similar intuition seems to underly the following position, which H. Wang [26] attributes to K. Gödel: "The universe of sets cannot be uniquely characterized (i. e. distinguished from all its initial segments) by any internal structural property [. . . ], which is expressible in any logic of finite or transfinite type [. . . ]."
As the second part of the quoted sentence suggests, reflection principles have been considered for rather general classes of properties. Usually, the aim was to justify strong axioms that go beyond those of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory. Early results in this direction are due to A. Lévy [17] and P. Bernays [2] . As examples of recent investigations into strong reflection principles, we cite the work of W. Tait [25] , P. Koellner [14] and P. Welch [27] .
In the present paper we will consider a reflection principle that is considerably weaker than those that have been mentioned in the previous paragraph. Unless otherwise noted, the expression "reflection principle" will refer to reflection for first order formulas with real parameters, which is given by the schema ∀ p⊆ω (ψ(p) → ∃ M ("M is a transitive set" ∧ ψ(p) M )).
Here ψ(p) is a formula in the usual first order language of set theory, with no further free variables (note that several real parameters are readily coded into one). The superscript M refers to the usual notion of relativization. An explanation for the restriction to real parameters will be given towards the end of this introduction. We point out that our reflection principle is an instance of the well-known reflection theorem that is provable in Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory. In particular, our characterization of reflection has to be established in a weaker base theory: All results of the present paper will be proved in KPi, which extends Kripke-Platek set theory by the assertion that each set lies in some admissible set. The additional assumption ∃ r⊆ω V = L(r), which has been mentioned in the abstract, will be made explicit wherever it is needed. Since our reflection principle is provable in Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, the present investigation cannot contribute to the justification of stronger axioms. However, Gödel's justification of reflection is just as meaningful in the context of weaker theories. We think that the connection with induction is particularly enlightening: It shows that reflection is related to questions around the absoluteness of wellfoundedness, which is another central theme in set theory. The result of the present paper seems particularly interesting in conjunction with M. Rathjen's ordinal analysis of reflection [19] . In the context of this work, Rathjen mentions that reflection for formulas of first order set theory corresponds to β-model reflection in second order arithmetic (a detailed proof of a similar result can be found in [20] ). In particular this shows that KPi is significantly weaker than its extension by the reflection principle, which justifies our choice of base theory. Let us also point out that the restriction to real parameters is natural when one is interested in consequences for second order arithmetic.
We now specify the induction principle to which reflection is supposed to be equivalent. Let us agree that a relation < X on a class X (both definable) is wellfounded if we have WF[X] :≡ ∀ w (w = ∅ → ∃ x∈w ∀ y∈w ¬ y < X x).
For a formula ϕ(x, z) with a distinguished induction variable x, induction along X can be expressed as Ind[X, ϕ] :≡ ∀ z (∀ x∈X (∀ y<X x ϕ(y, z) → ϕ(x, z)) → ∀ x∈X ϕ(x, z)).
Note that there is no restriction on the values of the parameters z. Our induction principle for ∆(R)-definable well-founded classes is the schema
where X is ∆-definable with a parameter p ⊆ ω. More precisely, the class X can be given by a Σ-formula θ Σ (x, y, p) and a Π-formula θ Π (x, y, p) that are supposed to define the relation x ≤ X y. The point is that X and < X can be recovered from ≤ X , provided that < X is well-founded and hence irreflexive. Formally, we abbreviate
To express that θ Σ and θ Π provide a ∆-definition of X p we use the formula
The second conjunct of ¬ Ind[X p , ϕ] M tells us that w is non-empty. By the assumption WF[X p ] we get an element x ∈ w such that y < p X x fails for all y ∈ w. The latter means that ∀ y<
, which is incompatible with x ∈ w.
In Sections 3 and 4 of this paper we show that the converse implication holds as well: Induction over ∆(R)-definable well-founded classes implies reflection for first order formulas with real parameters, under the assumption ∃ r⊆ω V = L(r). Here V denotes the universe of all sets, while L(r) is the constructible hierarchy over r (where L 0 (r) is the transitive closure of {r}). The idea is to approach reflection via completeness: Assuming that ψ(p) fails in every transitive model, we will show that ¬ψ(p) has a β-proof in the sense of J.-Y. Girard [9] , i. e. an ordinal-indexed family of proofs that glue to a class-sized proof tree. Induction over the latter implies that ¬ψ(p) holds in the universe, so that the premise of reflection for ψ(p) fails.
Our approach to completeness relies on K. Schütte's [21, 22] method of deduction chains: The idea is to build an attempted proof of a given formula ϕ from the bottom up. This will yield either a well-founded proof of ϕ or an attempted proof with an infinite branch. From the latter one can read off a countermodel to ϕ, provided that the proof search was sufficiently systematic. To prove the aforementioned equivalence between bar induction and ω-model reflection, Jäger and Strahm [11] have used deduction chains for ω-proofs. The present author [5] has shown that deduction chains can also be applied to β-proofs in the context of set theory.
Let us explain how deduction chains can be used to establish an instance
of reflection. Assuming V = L(r), the idea is to search for a model of the form
α . For this purpose we build an attempted proof S p,r
α -logic, for each ordinal α. More precisely, S p,r ψ (α) will be a subtree of the full L p,r α -branching tree. Each node of S p,r ψ (α) will be labelled by a formula ϕ (in fact by a sequent), which is decomposed according to a logical rule (possibly without premises, in which case S p,r ψ (α) has a leaf). For example, if we have ϕ ≡ ∀ x θ(x), then a node with label ϕ has children with labels θ(a) for all a ∈ L p,r α . The construction, which starts with ¬ψ(p) at the root and proceeds from the bottom up, can have two outcomes:
• The tree S p,r ψ (α) has an infinite branch.
• The tree S p,r ψ (α) is well-founded. If we get an infinite branch for some α, then we can read off an ordinal β ≤ α such that L p,r β is a countermodel to ¬ψ(p), similarly to Schütte's proof of completeness. In this case L p,r β is a model of ψ(p), so that the conclusion of reflection holds. If, on the other hand, the proofs S p,r ψ (α) are all well-founded, then we can glue them to a class-sized proof tree S p,r ψ (On). Now we use our principle of induction along well-founded classes: Since every node of S p,r ψ (On) corresponds to a valid inference in L p,r -logic (where L p,r is the union of all stages L p,r α ), we learn that the formula ¬ψ(p) at the root of this proof tree is true in L p,r = L(r) = V. In this case the premise of reflection fails.
Based on the preceeding proof sketch, we can now explain the restriction to real parameters: Each node of a tree S p,r ψ (α) does only contain a finite amount of information, which means that the information collected along a branch is at most countable. To be somewhat more precise, the method of deduction chains relies on the fact that each formula on a branch f is false in the corresponding model M f . This property is proved by induction over the length of formulas. In order to ensure that a formula ∃ x θ(x) on f fails in M f , every instance θ(a) with a ∈ M f must thus appear on f as well. However, a branch does only contain countably many formulas. Instead of reals, one could consider all hereditarily countable sets as parameters. This does not seem to increase generality, since hereditarily countable sets can be represented by well-founded trees (see e. g. [24, Section VII.3]).
In the proof that induction implies reflection, the class S p,r ψ (On) arose as the direct limit (i. e. essentially the union) of set-sized approximations S p,r ψ (α). Let us assume that S p,r ψ (α) is well-founded for every ordinal α, and hence well-ordered by the Kleene-Brouwer ordering. Then the map α → S p,r ψ (α) is a dilator in the sense of Girard [8] , i. e. an endofunctor of well-orders that preserves direct limits and pullbacks. As Girard has observed, dilators are essentially set-sized objects: Since any order is the direct limit of its finite suborders, all values T (α) of a dilator T are determined (up to isomorphism) by the values that T assumes on the finite ordinals and the strictly increasing functions between them. If the set { n, σ | σ ∈ T (n)} is countable, then we say that T is a countable dilator. A straightforward extension of the direct limit construction will yield a class-sized order T (On) that can be seen as the value of T on the class of ordinals (see Section 2 for details). We will speak of "induction over the limits of countable dilators" to refer to the schema
Note that we can quantify over T because dilators are essentially set-sized. The present author is not sure whether there is a connection with Girard's principle of "induction on dilators" (see [8, Section 3] ). In Section 2 we will see that induction over ∆(R)-definable well-founded classes implies induction over the limits of countable dilators (since T (On) is isomorphic to a ∆(R)-definable and wellfounded class). The proof sketched above will actually show that induction over the limits of countable dilators implies reflection with real parameters. Together with Theorem 1.1 above, this will close the circle of implications. An official statement of the resulting equivalence can be found in Theorem 4.4 below. From the proof of the equivalence one can read off some results about the complexity of the reflection formulas that are needed to derive induction for formulas from a given complexity class, and vice versa. These results are recorded in Remark 4.5.
Induction over the limits of dilators
In this section we recall the definition and basic properties of dilators. We then define the value T (On) of a dilator T on the class of ordinals. Finally, we show that induction along ∆(R)-definable classes justifies induction over the value T (On) of any countable dilator T . The notion of dilator is due to Girard [8] . Our account of dilators relies on the presentation in [6, Section 2] .
As mentioned in the introduction, dilators are particularly uniform endofunctors of well-orders. In fact we will consider endofunctors of linear orders, so that questions of well-foundedness can be treated separately. Let us agree to consider the category of linear orders with all embeddings (i. e. strictly increasing functions) as morphisms. To state the relevant uniformity condition we will need the finite subset functor [·] <ω on the category of sets. The latter is given by
[X] <ω := "the set of finite subsets of X",
where X is a set, f : X → Y is a function, and a ⊆ X is finite. The notation [X] <ω may also be used when X is a proper class. Note that KPi proves the existence of [X] <ω for any set X, in contrast to the full powerset (cf. [4, Section 1.2]). We will also write [X] <ω when X is a linear order, omitting the forgetful functor to the underlying set. In this case the elements of [X] <ω will be considered as suborders, i. e. with the induced order relation.
Concerning the formalization in KPi, let us agree that a class-sized function is ∆-definable (with arbitrary parameters) if the same holds for its graph. All functions that appear in the following will have ∆-definable domain. In this case it suffices to have a Σ-definition of the graph (as F (x) = y and ∀ z (F (x) = z → y = z) are equivalent when x lies in the domain of F ). We can now state the definition of dilators within our base theory: Definition 2.1. A class-sized prae-dilator consists of (i) an endofunctor T of linear orders, given by ∆-definable actions X → T (X) and f → T (f ) on objects resp. morphisms, and
(ii) a natural transformation supp :
<ω , given by a ∆-definable class function (X, σ) → supp X (σ), such that the following support condition is satisfied for any order X: Each element σ ∈ T (X) lies in the range of T (ι σ ), where ι σ : supp X (σ) ֒→ X is the inclusion map. If T (X) is well-founded for every well-order X, then (T, supp) is a class-sized dilator.
Let us point out that the restriction to ∆-definable functions is no real loss of generality: According to [6, Section 2], any dilator is equivalent to one that is given by primitive recursive set functions in the sense of R. Jensen and C. Karp [13] . The previous definition is more liberal, since the graph of any primitive recursive set function is ∆-definable.
We also mention that Girard originally defined dilators as functors that preserve direct limits and pull-backs. It turns out that these requirements are equivalent to the existence of a unique natural transformation as in part (ii) of the previous definition (due to Girard's normal form theorem [8] , or more explicitly by [4, Remark 2.2.2]). Girard's notion of pre-dilator (note the different spelling) involves an additional monotonicity condition, which is automatic for well-orders.
As explained in the introduction, the definition of a value T (On) on the class of ordinals is closely related to the fact that class-sized prae-dilators can be reconstructed from their values on the finite ordinals and the morphisms between them. In order to spell out the details, we declare that the category of natural numbers consists of the finite ordinals as objects (where n is considered as the ordered set {0, . . . , n − 1} of its predecessors) and all strictly increasing functions between them as morphisms. The following constructions yield an equivalence with the category of finite orders: Let |a| denote the cardinality of a finite set a. If the latter carries a linear order, then we write en a : |a| → a for the increasing enumeration. Given an embedding f : a → b of finite linear orders, there is a unique embedding |f | : |a| → |b| such that we have
Note that functors and natural transformations over the category of natural numbers can be given as set-sized objects. We recall the following definition from [6]. Definition 2.2. A set-sized prae-dilator consists of (i) a functor T from natural numbers to linear orders and (ii) a natural transformation supp :
<ω such that the following support condition is satisfied for any n < ω: Each element σ ∈ T (n) lies in the range of T (ι σ • en σ ), where en σ : | supp n (σ)| → supp n (σ) is the increasing enumeration and ι σ : supp n (σ) ֒→ n = {0, . . . , n − 1} is the inclusion.
The previous definition refers to ι σ • en σ where Definition 2.1 refers to ι σ . This modification was necessary since supp n (σ) may not be an object in the category of natural numbers. Assuming that T is defined on all morphisms between (finite) orders, the difference between the two definitions is inessential, since T (en σ ) will be an isomorphism. So if T is a class-sized prae-dilator, then its restriction T ↾ N to the category of natural numbers is a set-sized prae-dilator. Note that T ↾ N exists as a set, since the restriction of a ∆-definable class function to a set is a set-sized object (by Σ-collection and ∆-separation in KPi, cf. [1, Chapter I]).
Following the presentation in [6, Section 2], we now explain how class-sized praedilators can be reconstructed from their set-sized restrictions. The idea is that an element σ ∈ T (X) can be represented by the pair supp X (σ), σ 0 , where the element
. By the naturality of supp we get
which amounts to supp |a| (σ 0 ) = |a|. Given a set-sized dilator T and an order X, we now set
<ω and σ ∈ T (|a|) and supp |a| (σ) = |a|}.
To turn D T (X) into a linear order (cf. the proof of Lemma 2.5 below) we stipulate
where ι a : a ֒→ a ∪ b and ι b : b ֒→ a ∪ b are the inclusions. Given ordered sets X, Y and an embedding f :
a function supp
<ω by setting
<ω (a), σ and supp
In [6, Lemma 2.2] it has been verified that
) is a class-sized prae-dilator whenever T = (T, supp) is a set-sized prae-dilator. With the following definition, this remains true when the prefix "prae" is dropped:
is well-founded for every well-order X.
Let us now relate a class-sized prae-dilator T to the class-sized prae-dilator D T ↾N that has been reconstructed from its restriction. Making the above motivation official, we define a family of functions η
, where ι a : a ֒→ X is the inclusion. According to [6, Proposition 2.1], this yields a natural isomorphism η T :
is well-founded if the same holds for T (X), so that T ↾ N is a set-sized dilator if T is a class-sized dilator.
The previous considerations allow us to identify class-sized and set-sized (prae-) dilators for all purposes of the present paper. Usually, the perspective of class-sized dilators is more convenient in concrete cases (where T (X) has a more intuitive description than D T ↾N (X)), while the perspective of set-sized dilators is more satisfying from a foundational viewpoint (since general statements about set-sized dilators can be expressed in first order set theory). In the following we simply speak of (prae-) dilators when a definition or result applies in both the class-sized and the set-sized case (for class-sized T one may have to read T as T ↾ N).
In the first part of this section we have recalled some known facts about dilators. Let us now define the value of a dilator on the class On of ordinals: Definition 2.4. Given a prae-dilator T = (T, supp), we define a class T (On) with a relation < T (On) by stipulating
<ω and σ ∈ T (|a|) and supp |a| (σ) = |a|},
where ι a : a ֒→ a ∪ b and ι b : b ֒→ a ∪ b are the inclusions.
It is straightforward to check that T (On) is ∆-definable with parameter T (if T is set-sized) resp. T ↾ N (if T is class-sized). We show the following basic fact: Lemma 2.5. The class T (On) = (T (On), < T (On) ) is a linear order whenever T is a prae-dilator.
Proof. By assumption, each order T (n) = (T (n), < T (n) ) with n < ω is linear. It is straightforward to deduce that < T (On) is irreflexive. Trichotomy for < T (On) is readily reduced to the claim that T (|ι a |)(σ) = T (|ι b |)(τ ) implies a, σ = b, τ , as in [6, Lemma 2.2]. Since a, σ ∈ T (On) requires supp |a| (σ) = |a| we get
is a morphism in the category of linear orders, i. e. an embedding. In particular T (|ι a |) is injective, so that we also get σ = τ . To establish transitivity between a, σ , b, τ and c, ρ one considers the inclusions into a ∪ b ∪ c and uses the transitivity of T (|a ∪ b ∪ c|).
The following will be needed to justify induction over the value T (On):
Proof. As an immediate consequence of the definitions, we see that
is a suborder of T (On). The assumption that T is a dilator ensures that D T (α) is well-founded for every ordinal α (relying on the isomorphisms η
. Now consider a non-empty set w ⊆ T (On). By Σ-collection in KPi (in fact by a primitive recursive set function) we get an ordinal α such that a, σ ∈ w implies a ⊆ α, so that we have w ⊆ D T (α). Since the order D T (α) is wellfounded we get a < D T (α) -minimal element of w, which is also < T (On) -minimal.
Above we have mentioned that T (On) is ∆-definable with parameter T . The following definition will ensure that T is equivalent to a dilator that can be coded by a real. As usual, a set x is called countable if there is an injection f : x → ω. If x is non-empty, then this is equivalent to the existence of a surjection g : ω → x. Definition 2.7. Consider a (prae-) dilator T . If the set { n, σ | n < ω and σ ∈ T (n)} is countable, then T is called a countable (prae-) dilator.
If a sufficient amount of choice is available, then it is of course enough to demand that T (n) is countable for each n < ω. We have now defined all notions that appear in the principle of induction over the limits of countable dilators (cf. the introduction). The latter asserts that induction along the order T (On) is available whenever T is a dilator. The induction statement can be given by any formula in the usual language of first order set theory (with arbitrary parameters). In more symbolic terms, induction along the limits of countable dilators is the schema
Note that the quantification over T is only justified if we take T to be a set-sized dilator. Nevertheless, the principle is easily applied to a class-sized dilator T as well: Simply use induction along the limit of the set-sized restriction T ↾ N, observing that the definition of T (On) does only depend on the latter. We now prove one of the implications that was announced in the introduction:
Theorem 2.8. Induction over ∆(R)-definable well-founded classes implies induction over the limits of countable dilators.
Proof. As a special case, we first establish induction over the limit T (On) of a dilator T with the following property: The field of each order T (n) with n < ω is a subset of ω. Under this assumption one can code T by the real 
<ω and 0, |a|, σ ∈ T 0 and 3, |a|, σ, |a| ∈ T 0 }, which shows that T (On) is ∆(R)-definable (namely with parameter T 0 ). Similarly, one can check that the relation < T (On) on T (On) is ∆(R)-definable. From Proposition 2.6 we also know that T (On) is well-founded. Hence induction over T (On) is available by assumption. It remains to deduce the general case: Given a countable dilator S = (S, supp S ), one can construct a natural equivalence η : T ⇒ S between S and a set-sized prae-dilator T = (T, supp T ) such that T (n) ⊆ ω holds for all n < ω. T and D S . This ensures that T is a dilator, rather than just a prae-dilator. Hence the special case from the first half of the proof provides induction over T (On). To derive induction over S(On) we show that the ∆-definable class function
is an isomorphism: First observe that a, σ ∈ T (On) leads to supp S |a| (η |a| (σ)) = supp T |a| (σ) = |a|, as required for a, η |a| (σ) ∈ S(On). To see that the given map is order preserving we observe that
using the fact that η is a natural family of order embeddings. Surjectivity is readily deduced from the fact that η is an isomorphism.
To conclude this section we deduce a variant of induction along the limits of countable dilators, which will be particularly convenient in applications:
Remark 2.9. Consider a class-sized countable dilator T and a formula ϕ(α, σ), possibly with further parameters. We want to establish ∀ α ∀ σ∈T (α) ϕ(α, σ) by induction over the limit T (On) of T . I claim that it suffices to show that ϕ is progressive in the following sense, where ι β α : α ֒→ β denotes the inclusion. Given σ ∈ T (α), the statement ϕ(α, σ) follows from the assumption that we have ϕ(β, τ ) for all β ≥ α and all τ ∈ T (β) with τ < T (β) T (ι β α )(σ). Recall the isomorphisms η T α : D T (α) → T (α) considered above. As in the proof of Proposition 2.6 we see that η T α can be applied to elements a, σ 0 ∈ T (On) with a ⊆ α. Assuming that ϕ is progressive in the sense above, we will prove the following formula by induction over T (On):
where the equality relies on the naturality of η T :
is order preserving can be used to infer b, τ 0 < T (On) a, σ 0 . Now the assumption ϕ ′ ( b, τ 0 ) yields ϕ(β, τ ), as needed. Let us note that ϕ ′ is a Π n+1 -formula if the same holds for ϕ.
Transitive models via search trees
In the introduction we have described how Schütte's method of deduction chains can be used to search for transitive models of a given formula. The details of this approach will be worked out in the present section.
Our application of deduction chains will rely on the functorial version of the constructible hierarchy that has been introduced in [5, Section 3] (based on the author's PhD thesis [4] ). In the following we recall the main points of the construction. Full details can be found in the cited references. As in the latter we abbreviate a < fin X s :⇔ ∀ t∈a t < X s for a finite subset a ⊆ X and an element s ∈ X of a linear order (X, < X ). Given real parameters p, r ⊆ ω, we now construct a set L p,r X of terms together with a function supp
<ω by the following recursion:
X , and we have supp
• Given s ∈ X, a ∆ 0 -formula ϕ(x, y 1 , . . . , y n ) and terms a 1 , . . . , a n ∈ L p,r X with supp
Let us point out that this is exactly the same as [5, Definition 3.1] for the transitive set u = ω ∪ {p, r}. To be precise, we declare that our object formulas may contain the relation symbols ∈ and = for set membership and equality (even though the latter is definable). For technical convenience we only consider object formulas in negation normal form, which are built from negated and unnegated prime formulas with the connectives ∨, ∧ and the quantifiers ∀, ∃. In particular, negation becomes a defined operation that relies on de Morgan's rules and double negation elimination. In the introduction we have mentioned an assumption V = L(r). It seems fair to suppose that this refers to the usual constructible hierarchy, with L 0 (r) = "the transitive closure of {r}",
As usual we write L p,r and L(r) for the class of sets that lie in some stage L p,r α resp. L α (r). Let us ensure that the following is provable in our base theory (the use of admissible sets is convenient but not necessary):
We have L(r) ⊆ L p,r for arbitrary parameters p, r ⊆ ω.
Proof. Given an ordinal α, we want to find a β with L α (r) ∈ L p,r β . In particular this will yield L α (r) ⊆ L 
f (a n ))}. In [5, Section 3] it has been verified that this turns L p,r into a functor from linear orders to sets, and supp
<ω into a natural transformation. For our application of deduction chains it will be particularly important to have uniform enumerations of the sets L p,r X . The idea is that any a ∈ L p,r X is determined by the set supp
<ω of parameters (canonically ordered by < X ) and a Gödel number for the "bare" term in which these parameters have been replaced by free variables. As shown in [5, Theorem 3.7] , this leads to a family of surjections
which is natural in the sense that we have en 
These conjunctions and disjunctions mirror the obvious truth conditions. For example, a formula ϕ ≡ ∃ x∈b ψ( 
and a dual equivalence holds for conjunctive formulas. To deduce completeness it suffices to show that ϕ a ≺ ϕ for a ∈ ι α (ϕ) defines a well-founded relation ≺ on the set of L p,r α -formulas (see [5, Theorem 3.14] for details). We have now described all aspects of the functorial constructible hierarchy that are needed for our application of deduction chains. In order to spell out the latter, we need to fix some terminology: Given a set X, we write X <ω for the set of finite sequences with entries in X. To display the entries of a sequence σ ∈ X <ω we may write it as σ = σ 0 , . . . , σ n−1 , where n = len(σ) is the length of σ. In particular, the empty sequence is denoted by . For k ≤ len(σ) we set σ ↾ k := σ 0 , . . . , σ k−1 . The extension of σ ∈ X <ω by x ∈ X is denoted by σ
<ω from above, we define supp
. By an L p,r X -sequent we mean a finite sequence Γ = ϕ 0 , . . . , ϕ n−1 of L p,r X -formulas, which is supposed to represent the disjunction ϕ 0 ∨ · · · ∨ ϕ n−1 . As usual, we write Γ, ϕ rather than Γ ⌢ ϕ in the context of sequents. Finally, we use Cantor pairing to construct a surjective function n → π 0 (n), π 1 (n), π 2 (n) from ω onto ω × ω × ω, with π i (n) ≤ n for each i ≤ 2 and n < ω. We can now define the trees S p,r ψ (X) that have been mentioned in the introduction. Note that the construction is very similar to the one in [5, Definition 4.5].
Definition 3.2. Let ψ ≡ ψ(x) be a formula in the language of pure set theory, without further parameters. Given p, r ⊆ ω and an order X, we define a tree S p,r
<ω and a labelling function l X : S p,r
<ω . In the base case we stipulate ∈ S p,r ψ (X) and l X ( ) := ¬ψ(p) .
ψ (X) is to become a tree, the recursion step is only relevant for σ ∈ S p,r ψ (X). We then put n := len(σ) and write ϕ for the π 0 (n)-th formula of the sequent l X (σ) (which will have length n + 1). If ϕ ≃ a∈ιX (ϕ) ϕ a is conjunctive, then we set
and
If ϕ ≃ a∈ιX (ϕ) ϕ a is disjunctive, then we compute
<ω ×ω → L p,r X . We now define
X . The reader may have observed that the parameter r does not play any special role at the moment. Later, we will want to instantiate it with a real r ⊆ ω that satisfies V = L(r). Let us also point out that the elements of S p,r ψ (X) correspond to the deduction chains of Schütte [21, 22] . As usual, we say that f : ω → L p,r X is a branch of S p,r ψ (X) if we have f ↾ n := f (0), . . . , f (n − 1) ∈ S p,r ψ (X) for all n < ω. The next result is typical for the method of deduction chains. The following proof is very similar to the one of [5, Theorem 4.6]. We give a detailed presentation nevertheless, because the argument is indispensable for the understanding of our overall proof strategy.
Proof. Given a branch f of S p,r ψ (α), we define a set supp(f ) ⊆ α by putting supp(f ) :
Let h : β → α be a strictly increasing function with range supp(f ). We point out that h is provided by an instance of Mostowski's collapsing lemma that is already available in Kripke-Platek set theory (see [1, Section I.7] ). Say that an L p,r α -formula occurs on f if it is an entry of some sequent l α (f ↾ n) with n < ω. Our goal is to establish L • If ϕ ≃ a∈ι β (ϕ) ϕ a is conjunctive, then ϕ a [h] occurs on f for some a ∈ ι β (ϕ).
• If ϕ ≃ a∈ι β (ϕ) ϕ a is disjunctive, then ϕ a [h] occurs on f for every a ∈ ι β (ϕ).
These clauses reflect the fact that a conjunctive (resp. disjunctive) formula is false if some (resp. every) instance is false. Let us first establish the condition for a conjunctive formula ϕ: Given that ϕ[h] occurs on f , we may pick numbers k and m such that ϕ[h] is the k-th formula in the sequent l α (f ↾ m). Let n be a number with k = π 0 (n) and m = π 1 (n) ≤ n. In the construction of S p,r ψ (α) we have always extended sequents at the end, so that ϕ[h] is still the π 0 (n)-th formula in l α (f ↾ n).
The assumption that f is a branch yields ( 
. We have already seen that the latter formula occurs on f , as required by the condition above. It remains to verify the condition for a disjunctive formula ϕ. In this case we pick an arbitrary element a ∈ ι β (ϕ).
Since supp L α (b) is finite and the last union is increasing, we may pick a number Theorem 3.7] , the last inclusion allows us to write
for some number l. Now pick n with k = π 0 (n), m ′ = π 1 (n) ≤ n and l = π 2 (n). The construction of S p,r ψ (α) reveals that ϕ[h] b lies in the sequent l α (f ↾ (n + 1)). Recall that our overall goal is to establish reflection for a formula ψ(p) with a parameter p ⊆ ω. The previous theorem tells us that the conclusion of reflection holds if one of the trees S p,r ψ (α) has a branch. We now show that X → S p,r ψ (X) can be extended into a dilator if no such branch exists. In the following section we will use induction over S p,r ψ (On) to deduce that ¬ψ(p) holds in the universe, so that the assumption of reflection is violated. In order to obtain a prae-dilator, we must first construct an order relation < S p,r ψ (X) on the sets S p,r
X , we can take the Kleene-Brouwer order with
or there is a j < min{len(σ), len(τ )} with σ j < L p,r X τ j and σ i = τ i for all i < j.
We must also define the following structure: 
<ω for the extension of the function from the previous definition, with the same defining clause. The crucial claim is that
<ω . In particular this implies the claim about the range of S The results of the present section can be summarized as follows:
Corollary 3.7. Consider a formula ψ ≡ ψ(x). For arbitrary parameters p, r ⊆ ω, one of the following alternatives holds:
Proof. Assume that the second alternative fails. Then there is a well-order X such that S p,r ψ (X) is ill-founded. Since S p,r ψ is functorial, we may assume that X = α is an ordinal. Let us point out that this step relies on an instance of Mostowski's collapsing lemma that is provable in KPi but not in Kripke-Platek set theory alone (see e. g. [10] ). According to [4, Lemma 3.3.4] we can infer that the tree S 
From induction over a well-founded class to reflection
Recall that our goal is to establish reflection for a formula ψ(p). At the end of the previous section we have shown that ψ(p) holds in some transitive model, unless the family of proof trees S p,r ψ (α) forms a dilator. If the latter holds, then the construction from Section 2 yields a class-sized well-order S p,r ψ (On). In the present section we will use induction over S p,r ψ (On) to show that ¬ψ(p), which is the end formula of the proofs S p,r
Under the assumption L(r) = V this means that ¬ψ(p) holds in the set theoretic universe, so that the premise of reflection fails.
Our application of induction amounts to a soundness proof, which shows that all sequents in the class-sized proof trees S p,r ψ (α) are valid. Since there is no truth definition that would cover all formulas of set theory, we need to bound the complexity of the formulas that occur in the induction. For this purpose we interpret the Lévy hierarchy in a strict syntactical way, so that a Σ n -formula has to be of the form ∃ x1 ∀ x2 · · · Q xn θ and not merely equivalent to such a formula. We agree, however, that any subformula of a Σ n -resp. Π n -formula is counted as a formula from the same complexity class. By a Σ n (L p,r α )-formula we shall mean an L p,r α -formula of complexity Σ n (similarly for Π n ). The following result refers to the verification calculus that was discussed in the first half of the previous section.
Proof. Let us first assume that ϕ is disjunctive. It suffices to verify the claim in all the cases from [5, Definition 3.12] . As a first example, we consider
Since ϕ has complexity Σ n+1 , the instances ϕ a ≡ ψ(a) have complexity Π n , as required. To give a somewhat different example we consider a formula
In our definition of the functorial constructible hierarchy we have required that θ is a ∆ 0 -formula (cf. [5, Definition 3.1]). Hence the instances ϕ a ≡ θ(a, c) ∧ a = b have complexity ∆ 0 ⊆ Π n . As the second example shows, the formulas ϕ a do not need to be subformulas of ϕ, or only in a rather wide sense. All other disjunctive cases are verified similarly. If ϕ is conjunctive, then it must be a Π n (L p,r α )-formula. It follows that ¬ϕ is a disjunctive Σ n (L p,r α )-formula (recall that we consider negation as a defined operation that preserves prenex formulas). As in the proof of the disjunctive case, any instance (¬ϕ) a with a ∈ ι α (¬ϕ) is a Σ n (L Proof. By induction over (the length of) the sequence σ ∈ S p,r ψ (α) we prove the claim for any formula in l α (σ). For σ = it suffices to recall l α ( ) = ¬ψ(p) . To establish the induction step we consider a sequence σ ∈ S p,r ψ (α) of length n. As in Definition 3.2 we write ϕ for the π 0 (n)-th formula in l α (σ). Whenever σ ⌢ a is a sequence in S p,r ψ (α), the construction ensures that we have
(where the inclusion expresses that any formula in the sequent on the left is an entry of the sequent on the right). To complete the induction step it remains to show that ϕ b has the required form. The induction hypothesis implies that ϕ ∈ l α (σ) is a Σ n+1 (L p,r α )-formula (note that ¬ψ(p) is of this form). By the previous lemma it follows that ϕ b has complexity Π n .
Let us now discuss the truth definitions that will be used in the rest of this paper. Given an object formula ϕ of complexity ∆ 0 (with arbitrary sets as parameters), we say that ϕ is true if it holds in some (or equivalently every) transitive set that contains all parameters of ϕ. This yields a ∆ 1 -definition of truth for formulas in ∆ 0 = Σ 0 = Π 0 (see [4, Section 1.3] for the relevant constructions in our base theory KPi). By recursion in the meta theory we can now construct Σ n+1 -formulas (resp. Π n+1 -formulas) that define truth for Σ n+1 -formulas (resp. Π n+1 -formulas) of the object language (cf. [12, Chapter 13] ). We say that "ϕ is a true Σ n+1 -formula" in order to refer to these truth definitions. Often we simply say that "ϕ is true", as the complexity of the required truth definition can be inferred. Of course, one must We can now complete the proof of our main result. Precise formulations of the relevant reflection and induction principles can be found in Sections 1 and 2. of the reflection principle from (i). Up to logical equivalence we may assume that ψ(x) is a Π n+1 -formula, for a suitable number n. Consider an arbitrary p ⊆ ω and pick an r ⊆ ω with V = L(r), using the assumption of the theorem. From Corollary 3.7 we know that the conclusion of reflection is satisfied unless S p,r ψ is a countable dilator. So assume the latter. Invoking part (iii) of our equivalence, it follows that induction along the order S p,r ψ (On) is available. We will use this principle to show that ψ(p) is false, so that reflection holds because its premise is violated. To get an optimal result in terms of logical complexity, we argue by contradiction: Assume that ψ(p) is true. Under this assumption we will show that the following statement holds for any ordinal α and any sequence σ ∈ S p,r ψ (α) (note that l α refers to the labelling from Definition 3.2): ϕ(α, σ) :≡ "the sequent l α (σ) contains a true Π n (L p,r α )-formula". For α = 0 and σ = ∈ S p,r ψ (0) this implies the desired contradiction, since the only formula in l 0 ( ) = ¬ψ(p) is false by assumption. The claim that ϕ(α, σ) holds for all α and σ ∈ S p,r ψ (α) will be established by induction over S p,r ψ (On). More specifically, we use induction in the form that has been justified in Remark 2.9. This means that we have to deduce ϕ(α, σ) from the assumption that ϕ(β, τ ) holds for any β ≥ α and any τ ∈ S p,r ψ (β) with τ < S Together with Lemma 4.2 and the assumption that ψ(p) is true this means that all formulas in l α (σ) are false. Following Definition 3.2, we write θ for the π 0 (n)-ththat reflection for Π n+1 -formulas implies induction for Π n -formulas with real parameters, if n > 1. In the present paper we wanted to avoid this additional restriction on the parameters of an induction formula. Let us now consider the passage from induction along ∆(R)-definable well-founded classes to induction along the limits of countable dilators: In the proof of Theorem 2.8 the induction formula changes slightly, namely when it is transported along the isomorphism T (On) ∼ = S(On). The latter can be defined by a ∆-formula with an enumeration of S as a parameter. In particular the induction formula collects a new parameter that may not be a real. At the same time the induction formula stays within any class Π n with n > 0. Finally, we consider the result that induction along the limits of countable dilators implies reflection for first order formulas with real parameters: For n > 0, the proof of Theorem 4.4 deduces reflection for a Π n+1 -formula ψ from induction for a Π n -formula ϕ (in the latter, an existential quantification over l α (σ) can be avoided by forming the disjunction over all Π n -formulas in that sequent). In fact, the official induction formula is not ϕ but the corresponding formula ϕ ′ from Remark 2.9, which has complexity Π n as well. Altogether, we see that Σ n+2 -reflection implies Π n -induction, which in turn implies Π n+1 -reflection. The mismatch in terms of logical complexity seems to be caused by the partial restriction to real parameters.
